Bruno Tertrais, a political scientist and deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, is the author of numerous works on international security. His latest book is entitled Pax atomica? Theory, practice and limits of deterrence (Odile Jacob, 208 p., €20.90).
What are the specific features of the French nuclear doctrine?
It is not always known, but French military nuclear culture was forged by men trained within the framework of NATO, starting with Generals Gallois and Beauffre, who are among the fathers of the strike force. Notions readily presented as specific to France, such as the threat of “unacceptable damage” to an aggressor, are in fact American. The notion of “minimal” deterrence, what we call “strict sufficiency” – an arsenal maintained at the level just necessary – is a British invention, as is the idea that deterrence works “from the weak to the strong”.
There are only three specifically French concepts. First of all, the “ultimate warning”, which dates from the Pompidou years and was consolidated under Mitterrand. It was about avoiding the “all or nothing” approach, by considering, if necessary, a limited attack on military objectives. The French specificity consists in saying that there would be only one strike before the massive response. Also specifically French is the idea which consists in considering, since the mid-1990s, all weapons as “strategic”, whatever their characteristics. Finally, we speak of calling into question “vital interests”, to qualify our employment threshold. These last two ideas are today taken up across the Channel and across the Atlantic, because the doctrines influence each other.
Can deterrence be ethical?
The debate on deterrence and its ethics began in 1942, within Robert Oppenheimer's team. [physicien américain considéré comme l’inventeur de la bombe atomique], when nuclear weapons were still just a project. Is it moral to consider apocalyptic destruction to avoid war? Should we threaten civilian populations for this purpose?
To these questions, the countries that have acquired the bomb do not all give the same answer. The United States and France believe, for moral, legal and strategic reasons, that civilian populations should not be threatened as such. The United States took this position in the 1970s, while France did so only in 2014, specifying that it only threatened centres of power. For a long time, in French discourse, we spoke of “non-use weapons”, but this expression was ambiguous, because, for deterrence to work, the adversary must be convinced that it could be used.
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Source: Lemonde
